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Abstract— As Cloud Computing becomes the trend of 
information technology computational model, the Cloud 
security is becoming a major issue in adopting the Cloud where 
security is considered one of the most critical concerns for the 
large customers of Cloud (i.e. governments and enterprises). 
Such valid concern is mainly driven by the Multi-Tenancy 
situation which refers to resource sharing in Cloud Computing 
and its associated risks where confidentiality and/or integrity 
could be violated. As a result, security concerns may harness 
the advancement of Cloud Computing in the market. So, in 
order to propose effective security solutions and strategies a 
good knowledge of the current Cloud implementations and 
practices; especially the public Clouds; must be understood by 
professionals. Such understanding is needed in order to 
recognize attack vectors and attack surfaces. In this paper we 
will propose an attack model based on a threat model designed 
to take advantage of Multi-Tenancy situation only. Before that, 
a clear understanding of Multi-Tenancy, its origin and its 
benefits will be demonstrated. Also, a novel way on how to 
approach Multi-Tenancy will be illustrated. Finally, we will try 
to sense any suspicious behavior that may indicate to a possible 
attack where we will try to recognize the proposed attack 
model empirically from Google trace logs. Google trace logs 
are a 29-day worth of data released by Google. The data set 
was utilized in reliability and power consumption studies, but 
not been utilized in any security study to the extent of our 
knowledge. 
Keywords – Cloud Computing; Security; Multi-Tenancy; 
Attack Models;Cloud Data. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cloud Computing is recognized as currently one of the 
most popular technologies available; it can be seen as an 
instance of Computing as a Utility. In Computing as a 
Utility, customers utilize the concept of “pay-as-you-go” for 
applications, computing and storage resources [4] [5]. Along 
with the pay-as-you-go concept, the elasticity in upgrading 
or downgrading resources makes Cloud Computing a 
popular model for organizations [15]. Moreover, the cost 
effectiveness of Cloud Computing is encouraging its 
adoption; enterprises requiring a high level of elasticity and 
about to decide whether to build up their own IT 
infrastructure or to utilize Cloud infrastructure may find that 
using a Cloud infrastructure will give a better balance 
between cost and elasticity [5] [9] [15] [17]. 
Cloud Computing is defined as “a system, where the 
resources of a data centre is shared using virtualization 
technology, which also provide elastic, on demand and 
instant services to its customers and charges customer usage 
as utility bill” [4]. Pay-as-you-Go and Elasticity along with 
On-Demand, Broad network access, Scalability and 
Virtualization are considered as the essential characteristics 
of Cloud Computing Model. 
With the benefits of Cloud Computing come along 
challenges to the model; one of the most challenging of these 
aspects is security. Information Security refers to protecting 
information and information systems from unauthorized 
access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, inspection, 
recording or destruction. Based on a study for the Cloud 
Security Alliance (CSA), there are seven top threats that 
organizations will face in adopting Cloud Computing [7]. 
These are Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud Computing, 
Insecure Application Programming Interfaces (API), 
Malicious Insiders, Shared Technology Vulnerabilities, Data 
Loss/Leakage, Account, Service and Traffic Hijacking and 
Unknown Risk Profile. In addition, another study by Gartner 
has also identified seven Cloud Computing security risks, 
which are Outsourcing Services, Regulatory Compliance, 
Data Location, Shared Environment, Business Continuity 
and Disaster Recovery, Hard Environment for Investigating 
Illegal Activity and Long Term Viability [8]. Moreover, a 
survey of Cloud providers by the International Data 
Corporation (IDC) in 2008 to study the obstacles or concerns 
for adopting Cloud Computing in enterprises showed that 
security as a concern came first with 88.5% of the votes, 
whilst availability; which is one of information security 
principles; came third with 84.8% of the votes [11] [17]. 
Such concerns are driven by Cloud nature of shared 
resources and Multi-Tenancy. The threat of data compromise 
increases in the Cloud, due to the increased number of 
parties leading to an increase in the number of points of 
access [2]. Also, delegating data control to the Cloud leads to 
an increase in the risk of data compromise where outsourced 
services bypass the personal, logical and physical security 
controls of a consumer. A number of concerns emerge 
regarding the issues of Multi-Tenancy and data remanance. 
Multi-Tenancy refers to resource sharing in Cloud 
Computing where any resource object is reusable in the 
Cloud infrastructure. Reusable objects must be carefully 
controlled and managed since they create a serious 
vulnerability and violate confidentiality through possible 
data leakage. Data leakage in this context may be caused by 
the fact that hardware in Cloud Computing is not separated; 
there is a good level of separation in Cloud Computing at the 
application and virtual layer but not enough in the hardware 
layer [1]. Also, confidentiality could be breached due to the 
reusability of resource objects through data remanance, 
where a customer can request storage space from a Cloud 
provider and run a scan in order to search for sensitive data 
to other customers [1] [2] [6]. 
The most important challenge in studying security in 
Cloud Computing relies on the trade-off between security 
and cost, which is itself one of the important factors in 
shifting to Cloud Computing. Tim Watson, Head of the 
computer forensics and security group at De Montfort 
University notes: 
‘‘...although one provider may offer a wonderfully secure 
service and another may not, if the latter charges half the 
price, the majority of organizations will opt for it as they 
have no real way of telling the difference.’’ [4].  
Also, George Wrenn, Security Solutions Director at 
Unisys recommends that customers must consider other 
factors more than price and top feature sets (i.e. feature sets 
will be different from one Cloud provider to another) before 
deciding to move critical systems and applications to Cloud 
[4]. From the previous quotations the trade-off between 
security and cost is obvious, where security is considered 
relatively costly. 
The goal of our work is to understand Multi-Tenancy. 
Moreover, we will try to sense any suspicious behavior that 
may indicate to a possible attack based on a proposed attack 
model. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 
II highlights and identifies Multi-Tenancy as vulnerability. 
Section III focuses in Multi-Tenancy its definition, origins 
and its benefits. Section IV highlights the security challenges 
in dealing with Multi-Tenancy. Section V shows the scheme 
where system model, threat model, attack model and our 
approach in undertaking Multi-Tenancy is presented. Section 
VI will illustrate the reconstruction of the attack model from 
Google’s dataset. Finally, section VII and VIII will present 
the future work and conclude this paper. 
II. LITTERATEUR REVIEW  
Multi-Tenancy has been identified as a security issue in 
Cloud Computing by several researchers such as [1] who 
conducted a survey on security issues in service delivery 
models in Clouds and stated that Multi-Tenancy is a major 
Cloud Computing characteristic that may lead to 
confidentiality violation. [2] Also identifies Multi-Tenancy 
as a major threat to both confidentiality and privacy when 
talking about Cloud Computing security. In addition, [4] 
highlighted shared technology vulnerabilities – hence Multi-
Tenancy – as one of the top threats to Cloud computing in a 
survey done on the existing literature. Moreover, [9] 
recognizes Multi-Tenancy as a new source of threat in Cloud 
Computing infrastructure. 
From another point of view [10] links between Multi-
Tenancy as a form of shared environment and the attraction 
of malicious activities in the Clouds. Intel IT Centre [13] 
generated a document of best practices on building secure 
Clouds; yet clearly highlights Multi-Tenancy and shared 
technology issues as security challenges for a Cloud 
environment. Where [14] in his work proposed a layered 
security approach for Cloud Computing, and states that 
virtualization is one of the process hosting layer (i.e. servers) 
issues where competitors will have separate virtual machines 
in the same physical machine; hence Multi-Tenancy. 
In [15] several areas were identified as danger in Clouds; 
under data governance the writer highlighted that Multi-
Tenancy arrangements in Clouds are raising questions about 
data segregation. While NIST developed a  report titled 
“Guidelines on Security and Privacy in Public Cloud 
Computing”; they identify Multi-Tenancy as of the security 
and privacy downsides in the Cloud [15]. In a totally 
different approach [17] interviewed five leading scientists 
from the cloud community; Raghu Ramakrishnan the Chief 
Scientist for Search and Cloud Platforms at Yahoo! was one 
of them, where his response to the question of “On a related 
note, for a graduate student starting a PhD, what would you 
say are the key fundamental challenges of cloud computing 
that should be addressed by new research in the field?” 
included Multi-Tenancy as a fundamental challenge of Cloud 
Computing. Again [18] raised questions in how Cloud 
Computing affecting security, privacy and trust; where he 
identifies Multi-Tenancy as one of the security issues. 
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) released a document 
titled “Security as a Service” [26] where they tries to define 
categories for services; they raised the question “How does 
one assure data isolation in a multi-tenant environment?”. 
Also, CSA in the same document stated that Multi-Tenancy 
is creating new targets for intrusion. In a study done by [19] 
to identify the challenges of security and privacy in Cloud 
Computing; Multi-Tenancy is recognized as one of the 
unique implications of security and privacy in Cloud 
computing. In the same direction [28] defines Multi-Tenancy 
as a major characteristic of Cloud Computing and a major 
dimension in the Cloud security problem that needs a vertical 
solution from the Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) down to 
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS). Where [20] highlight the 
fact that Multi-Tenancy may enable information leakage and 
increase attack surface which will affect the security of the 
Clouds. Also, [31], [32] and [33] considered Multi-Tenancy 
among the serious issues in Cloud security. 
After highlighting Multi-Tenancy as a security concern in 
Cloud Computing, the need for a deep understanding of 
Multi-Tenancy is required in order to deal with it effectively. 
III. MULTI-TENANCY  
Multi-Tenancy is a natural result of trying to achieve 
economic gain in Cloud Computing by utilizing 
virtualization and allowing resource sharing [9] [15]. AS 
defined earlier, Multi-Tenancy refers to resource sharing in 
Cloud Computing, but such a definition is still general in the 
context of Cloud Computing, where Multi-Tenancy is seen 
differently from different service models. 
In Software as a Service (SaaS), applications are 
provided as a service by the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) 
where the customer cannot monitor or control the underlying 
infrastructure; here, Multi-Tenancy means that two or more 
customers utilize the same service or application provided by 
the CSP regardless of the underlying resources [13]. 
In Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), where the customer 
is capable of provisioning computing, storing and 
 Figure 1: Multi-Tenancy Benefits' Tree. 
 
Figure 2: Difference between Multi-Tenancy and Traditional Cases. networking resources and can control but cannot manage the 
underlying infrastructure, Multi-Tenancy occurs when two or 
more virtual machines (VMs) belonging to different 
customers share the same physical machine (PM) [15]. 
Multi-Tenancy has brought different arguments in Cloud 
Computing. While software developers see it as an 
opportunity, security experts see it as vulnerability [3] [12] 
[13] [15]. Even though security experts agree that Multi-
Tenancy is a vulnerability that could lead to confidentiality 
being exposed, they vary in providing the solution for such 
vulnerability. 
Whereas [12] suggests the elimination of the 
virtualization layer in order to prevent multi tenancy, [15] 
suggests that the provider should expose the risk of Multi-
Tenancy to the customer and do nothing about it (i.e. give 
them the option of paying extra to avoid Multi-Tenancy). 
The first strategy seems very effective, but would eliminate 
vital benefits for Cloud providers such as VM mobility and 
financial gain due to resource sharing. 
VM mobility is one of these benefits where providers can 
easily reallocate VMs to achieve better utilization and save 
power consumption. On the other hand, the second strategy 
will not enhance the Cloud security and customers especially 
enterprises are holding back investment in Cloud Computing 
because of security issues [1] [9] [19]. 
Moreover, current practice of UK enterprises is to deploy 
Private Clouds in order to cut costs and safeguard sensitive 
data [1]. We therefore identify that a solution securing Multi-
Tenancy yet keeping its benefits is needed. So, a deep 
understanding of Multi-Tenancy is required in order to 
identify all the possible benefits brought to Cloud 
Computing because of Multi-Tenancy.  
 
Virtualization + Resource Sharing = Multi-Tenancy    (1) 
 
As equation (1) shows, in order for Multi-Tenancy to 
occur both virtualization and resource sharing must be 
allowed by the CSP. Fig. 1 shows all the identified possible 
benefits of Multi-Tenancy and by looking into the tree’s 
leaves, it is easily recognized that the origin of the benefits 
could be linked either to virtualization, resource sharing or 
by combining both of them. For instance, separating the 
hardware failure from the software failure is achieved by 
virtualization. On the other hand, sharing the resource will 
increase the utilization which will lead to a reduction in cost 
by making the resource available for more than one 
customer. In other cases such as over provisioning and VM 
mobility, both virtualization and resource sharing will 
amplify their impact. VM mobility can contribute in 
maximizing the utilization of the infrastructure or reducing 
the power consumption by reallocating VMs into clusters 
and minimizing the number of servers used. Whereas over 
provisioning is considered one of the major features of Cloud 
Computing as it gives the opportunity for the CSP to seal 
more than the capacity of his infrastructure. These features 
are important for Cloud Computing and any proposed 
solution must adds to them or at least try to keep them and 
not to eliminate any one of them. 
IV. MULTI-TENANCY SECURITY CHALLENGES  
What is unique about Multi-Tenancy in Cloud 
Computing is that both the attacker and the victim are 
sharing the same server (i.e. physical machine (PM)). Such a 
setup cannot be mitigated by traditional security techniques 
and measures, simply because it is not designed to penetrate 
inside servers and their monitoring techniques are limited to 
the network layer [19] [20]. 
To illustrate, Fig. 2 shows the different cases of attacker 
and victim locations and the networking between them. In 
case one, the attacker and the victim both are regular Internet 
users; in order to defend against such attacks, traditional 
network security techniques and devices are efficient. 
In case two, both attacker and victim are customers in the 
same Cloud provider but each one of them is located on a 
separate server. This kind of setup is due to the utilization of 
the virtualization layer in the Cloud Computing Model; to 
secure such a setup, virtual network security devices and 
techniques must be implemented by Cloud providers [20]. 
Case three describes the problem that we intend to 
address in future work, where both the attacker and the 
victim are customers in the same Cloud and are sharing the 
same server. Such a situation is due to Multi-Tenancy; 
securing such a setup is not an easy task as network 
communication between the attacker’s VM and the victim’s 
VM is limited within the physical machine (PM). Therefore, 
traffic will not leave the physical machine, which is harder to 
be mitigated by virtual network security defenses as opposed 
to case two. 
In order to secure such vulnerability, we must first 
answer the following question: how is Multi-Tenancy 
exploited? An answer can be found in [15], where an attack 
is generated over the Amazon EC2 Cloud to investigate data 
leakage. In order to carry out the attack, network probing is 
performed; following this, a brute force attack is generated to 
take advantage of the Multi-Tenancy effect by allocating the 
attacker’s VM beside the victim’s VM. The results show that 
 Figure 3: Proposed System Model. 
by spending just a few dollars, an attacker has a 40% chance 
to allocate his VM beside the victim’s VM. After achieving 
Multi-Tenancy, a side channel attack – any attack takes 
advantage of the system characteristics – is generated to 
extract the data of the victims. 
Obviously, any tenant can attack its neighbor because the 
type of attack that could be utilized, such as side channels, 
cannot be detected by the hypervisor or even the operating 
system. 
So, there is no way to eliminate the Multi-Tenancy effect 
in order to keep its benefits yet the effect could be minimized 
and that what is this paper is trying to illustrate. Multi-
Tenancy cannot be eliminated, yet a smart resource 
allocation technique will minimize the risk of Multi-
Tenancy; in other words, a resource allocation technique will 
increase the level of difficulty of achieving Multi-Tenancy 
for customers, yet is easily managed by Cloud providers. 
What is interesting of Multi-Tenancy is that in order to 
achieve it for targeted victims, the attacker needs to invest an 
effort, time and cost. So, by making Multi-Tenancy difficult 
to be achieved by customers, we are restricting the number 
of potential attackers. 
V. SCHEME 
In this section a proposed system model, threat model 
and attack model will be demonstrated. Also, our approach 
in undertaking Multi-Tenancy security is presented. The 
main issue is to highlight Multi-Tenancy as an attack surface 
and try to control it by the proposed system model in the 
following.  
A. System Model 
Our proposed system model is shown in Fig. 3, where all 
the solid black links (i.e. 1c, 2c, 3c, 4c, 5c, 6c and 7c) 
represent control channels which are under Cloud provider 
control and responsibility. And all the dashed blue links (i.e. 
1o, 2o and 3o) are operation channels where the letter (c) 
donates control and letter (o) donates operation. The 
separation of these channels is vital in order to enhance 
system security and implement security in depth. The red 
links reflects the attack path and the attacker interaction with 
the system. All the system components are defined below; 
following this, a description of the system flow is given. 
• Registration Unit: the initial contact between the 
consumer and Cloud provider. Registration can be an 
online form or a contract signed between both parties. In 
this phase, all important information that will define the 
allocation mechanism should be gathered. 
• Verification and approval Unit: this is a vital phase 
where the provider should verify and approve the 
information given by the customer. The importance of 
such a process is to protect the provider’s image by 
avoiding any fraud possibility. 
• Control Database Unit: is the location where the 
parameters and restrictions of the resource allocation 
technique are stored. There are two contacts to this 
Database; the first is made by the Cloud provider in 
order to store the customer information to be utilized by 
the allocation technique; the second is made by the 
resource allocation manager in order to extract the 
customers’ resource allocation restrictions. 
• Resource Allocation Manager Unit (RAMU): is 
responsible for allocating resources following a 
customer request. The RAMU is the only system 
component to access the control database. 
• Resource Allocation Map Database Unit: this Database 
is responsible of keeping updated records of resource 
allocation.  
To understand this system better, we describe the 
scenario of a customer joining a Cloud provider. The process 
starts when a customer needs to utilize a public IaaS Cloud 
as its infrastructure. Firstly, the customer will register either 
online or by visiting the Cloud provider. Then, the provider 
will verify the information provided by the customer; official 
documents could be used for this purpose. If the customer 
passes the verification process, the provider will approve the 
process to the next stage. After the verification and approval 
processes, the customer’s data will be stored in the control 
Database where all resource allocation restrictions will be 
specified by the CSP. 
When the customer has been registered successfully and 
security restrictions are specified, the system is ready to be 
utilized by the customer. The customer’s request to allocate 
resources shall be sent to the resource allocation manager 
unit (RAMU). Then, the RAMU will request the security 
restrictions from the control Database and the current 
resource allocation map from the resource allocation map 
Database in order to allocate the customer’s resources in the 
proper location. And whenever a customer releases a 
resource the resource allocation map Database is updated 
immediately. In such a setup, an attacker will not have the 
chance to take advantage of the resource allocation 
mechanism, and the benefits of Multi-Tenancy are preserved. 
An extra benefit of this system is that the control 
Database can have a different resource allocation method, 
whereby the system model will not be changed. This 
advantage will give the Cloud provider the opportunity to 
define security restrictions based on their business strategy. 
Also, it gives the provider the chance to implement their own 
resource allocation methods if needed. Moreover, it could be 
a security best practice to change the resource allocation 
method periodically in order to raise the system difficulty 
and make it hard to be predicted. 
B. Threat Model  
In this section we will describe our assumptions in regard 
to the environment. In the attack model shown in Fig. 4, an 
assumption of a secure hypervisor (the infrastructure 
 Figure 4: Attack Model. 
management component) is made. Also, an attacker is 
assumed to know nothing about the Cloud provider 
infrastructure, which is more like a real situation. Moreover, 
the assumption that the Cloud provider is allowing Multi-
Tenancy is made, which is a natural result of allowing 
resource sharing over virtualization; this is noticed in most 
Cloud implementations. The attack will take advantage of 
Multi-Tenancy regardless of any other Cloud component and 
feature. So, the attack is designed to exploit Multi-Tenancy 
and all the phases before being a Multi-Tenant does not take 
advantage of any Cloud well-known vulnerability such as the 
hypervisor vulnerability.   
C. Attack Model  
The Attack model we use is based on one of the scenarios 
utilized by [15] to explore information leakage in Amazon 
EC2 public Cloud. The nature of Information Security 
(InfoSec) for a specific vulnerability is that there could be a 
large number of attacks to exploit it [15]. However, one 
successful attack against a system will identify most of the 
possible vulnerabilities that can be utilized. Moreover, 
attacks vary in the sense of their behavior; for example, it is 
easy to detect any distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack 
and any attack consisting of port scanning due to the 
unexpected increase in traffic. Also, it is easy to identify 
viruses due to their unique signatures; whereas it is hard 
enough to detect iFrame attacks. An iFrame attack is an 
attack where an HTML code is embedded inside another 
HTML code as a frame in order to collect credit card 
information for instance. The following is a list of well-
known attacks that could be utilized efficiently over the 
Cloud infrastructure: 
 
• Side Channel attack: a side channel attack is any attack 
based on information gained from the physical 
implementation of a system. There are many side 
channel attacks known in the field; some of the well-
known side channel attacks are timing attacks, power 
consumption attacks and differential fault analysis. 
• Brute Forcing: brute forcing is an attack strategy or 
mechanism which could be applied over any kind of 
attack. It is one of the simplest strategies in order to 
build an attack but yet it is one of the most common 
used strategies. For instance if an attacker wants to find 
out a password of a system by utilizing a brute force 
strategy, the attacker will try every possible combination 
until the correct password is found. Therefore, brute 
forcing can be defined as running an attack operation 
multiple times until a successful breach is achieved. 
Brute forcing is identified as one of the top ten attacks 
by the Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) where 
it forms 22% of data breach attacks [14]. 
• Network Probing: is a mechanism to find out the 
physical topology of a network that consists of IPs and 
servers connected in the network. Such information can 
be utilized to identify possible targets and to design an 
attack for a sub group in the network. 
The attack model we propose is generated in three phases 
as shown in Fig. 4. In phase one, attacker register with the 
Cloud provider as a normal customer. In phase two, the 
attacker gathers information about the allocation technique 
and the Cloud infrastructure where network probing is 
utilized. The attacker can make sense of the allocation 
technique simply by requesting resources and then releasing 
them; this action will give the attacker knowledge of the 
allocation technique. Moreover, the attackers can take 
advantage of the information revealed by the Cloud provider 
about their infrastructure or any kind of systems or 
techniques they are using. After that, the attacker can utilize 
brute force techniques to generate VMs in order to achieve 
Multi-Tenancy. In phase three, after the attacker achieved 
Multi-Tenancy, a side channel attack is generated to extract 
the victim’s data. 
D. Approach 
Once agreed that Multi-Tenancy is a vulnerability then 
we need to choose one of the well-known risk strategies in 
order to control and minimize its impact. There are four 
strategies to deal with risks; these four strategies are as 
follow: 
 
• Eliminating the risk. 
• Mitigating the risk. 
• Transferring the risk. 
• Accepting the risk. 
 
Although eliminating the risk considered the most 
powerful strategy, it is not possible to apply it on Multi-
Tenancy as most of the Cloud Computing benefits are linked 
to it, as illustrated previously. 
So, in order to eliminate the risk of Multi-Tenancy we 
have to eliminate Multi-Tenancy and that can be achieved by 
either eliminating what makes Multi-Tenancy vulnerable or 
eliminating what forms Multi-Tenancy in the first place.  
As mentioned previously in equation (1) that Multi-
Tenancy is a natural result of allowing resource sharing over 
virtualization. So, in order to eliminate Multi-Tenancy we 
need to either eliminate the use of virtualization or disable 
resource sharing. 
In both cases that is not acceptable as that will eliminate 
most of the Cloud Computing main drivers and marketing 
strength features as shown in Fig. 1. 
The other direction is to try to eliminate what makes 
Multi-Tenancy vulnerable which is the possibility of taking 
advantage of the shared environment. Such possibility is 
valid because of the side channel attacks where side channel 
 Figure 5: Approach in Securing Multi-Tenancy. 
attacks defined as taking advantage of the physical 
characteristics of the system. 
So, Side channel attacks by their nature are unlimited in 
there number and evolve with time which makes it hard to 
eliminate all the possible side channel attacks. In addition, 
dealing with the known side channel attacks is not an easy 
task where the forms of such attacks are multiple. 
For example, there are researchers dealing with the 
memory as the attack vector such as [40] where they propose 
to eliminate the shared memory attack. Although, they 
achieved the goal but their solution was a hypervisor 
dependent where it worked only over Xen. 
Another form of attack is the timing side channel attacks 
and [41] in his proposal was able to eliminate three forms of 
timing side channel attacks. However, in order to eliminate 
these three forms of timing side channel attacks the CSP 
must sacrifice 2/3 of his infrastructure. In other words 2/3 of 
the infrastructure is overhead and the solution will not 
eliminate all the timing side channel attacks without even 
mentioning the other forms of side channel attacks. 
From the previous two examples it is quite obvious that 
trying to eliminate all the side channel attacks will be at a 
very high cost if it is possible in the first place. 
Furthermore, some of the known side channel attacks 
have a tight relationship where two forms of side channel 
attacks cannot be eliminated in the same time [18]. In other 
words if the vulnerability of side channel attack A is 
eliminated, the vulnerability of side channel attack B cannot 
be eliminated. So, if attack A is blocked that means attack B 
will be successful. 
Since we cannot eliminate the side channel attacks and 
cannot tolerate the loss of major features due to the 
elimination of either virtualization or resource sharing then 
the eliminating the risk strategy is not acceptable and is not 
applicable when it comes to dealing with Multi-Tenancy 
risks. So, the second best strategy is to mitigate the risk and 
this is what we are after; where we try to balance between 
the benefits brought by Multi-Tenancy and the security 
putting in minds other factors such as performance and cost. 
Fig. 5 illustrates our approach where we highlighted Multi-
Tenancy as vulnerability and a security concern in Cloud 
Computing and we illustrated that layer 1 cannot be 
eliminated either partially or completely. Also, layer 3 
cannot be eliminated totally as described earlier. 
So, the only angle left is how to go from layer 1 into 
layer 2. In other words how does Multi-Tenancy happen in 
the IaaS Clouds? And the answer is the resource allocation 
mechanism. And in order to mitigate the Multi-Tenancy risks 
the resource allocation mechanism must be controlled. 
Making the resource allocation mechanism a security aware 
mechanism will enhance the total security for the CSP and 
will minimize the surface attack. In addition, minimizing the 
probability of being a Multi-Tenant by controlling the 
resource allocation mechanism will have an impact on the 
underlying layer (i.e. layer 3) as layer 3 is dependent on layer 
2. 
VI. GOOGLE TRACE LOGS 
To better understand the issues and challenges in 
developing and adopting the Cloud, an analysis on real 
Cloud data is a crucial step. 
Google have recently released two sets of data (7-day and 
29-day sets) [33]. These sets have been studied and analyzed 
by a number of researchers in the literature [44 - 48]. Those 
studies were focusing on resources utilization, scheduling, 
relations with Grid/HPC systems, scalability, cluster 
management and behavior of workloads but with little focus 
on user behavior, security and the patterns of the workloads. 
To clarify, the users of these trace logs have been 
identified as Google engineers and services [33] [38]. 
Reference [39] has concluded that there is a 
dependence/relationship between resource utilization, 
number of tasks and user patterns. Another study by [33] 
which has examined Google trace logs in terms of workload 
characteristics stated that the most notable workload 
characteristic is heterogeneity. They state that such 
heterogeneity lead to complications in resource allocations 
and utilizations. 
In addition, [35] conducted a comparative study between 
Google dataset and Grid/HPC systems, stating that Google 
workloads show that resource allocations are finer with 
respect to CPU and Memory than that of Grid/HPC systems. 
Reference [38] conducted a study on the workload 
characteristics of Google Dataset. They concluded that 
machines are continuously taken offline and online to 
combat system failures and to apply upgrades. Also, many of 
the submitted jobs are not latency sensitive as more jobs are 
killed before normal completion.  
Therefore, having reviewed the related part of the 
literature and after examining the Google dataset, it is 
concluded that the Workload consists of many patterns, 
depending on the angle of attention. In this paper we 
highlighted Multi-Tenancy as vulnerability and provided in 
depth understanding related to different dimensions of Multi-
Tenancy. So, we decided to empirically investigate the 
possibility of reconstructing the proposed attack model from 
the dataset released by Google. Such activity can be used as 
a monitoring tool where CSP can monitor some behavior that 
can be linked to well-known attack models.    
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Figure 6: Number of Killed Tasks per User Where (A) is the lift figure and (B) is the right figure. 
A. Reconstruct the Attack Model from the Dataset 
In this section we will try to find out, is it possible to 
sense a suspicious behavior in the dataset, and to do so we 
will utilize the attack model proposed earlier and try to 
highlight if we can map it to the dataset either entirely or 
partially. 
In order to find out a pattern of the attack model reflected 
on the dataset we will focus on phase two in Fig. 4. Since we 
do not have any information about phase one; which is the 
registration; in the dataset we will not look at it. In the case 
of phase two we will focus on brute forcing technique where 
it could be investigated based on Google’s dataset. 
So, in order to sense a brute forcing behavior we targeted 
the killed tasks in the dataset. In the dataset there were nine 
event types that any task can be tagged with. Between the 
nine event types there was a killed task event which 
represents a task was cancelled by the customer or a driver 
program. The killed task event is the only task event consists 
of human interaction where the customer could terminate the 
task. 
So, in our analysis we decided to utilize the killed tasks 
to sense any brute forcing behavior. In our analysis we 
accepted the fact that cyber-attacks may be generated by 
humans or software and brute forcing is not an exception. 
The dataset consists of 25,000,000 task and 6,608,917 of the 
total number of tasks is tagged as killed tasks which 
represent 26.4% of the total number of tasks. The total 
number of customers in the dataset was 925 active 
customers. Only 725 of them committed a kill task event. 
Fig. 6 (A) shows all the customers who killed a task or more 
and Fig. 6 (B) shows the top thirty customers in terms of 
killing tasks. 
We observed that most of the customers did not pass the 
threshold of killing tasks which is 200,000; only three 
customers passed that threshold. The customers IDs are 290, 
772 and 225 where 290 notably killed over 450,000 tasks 
and 772 killed around 250,000 tasks. Also, we observed that 
the highest eight customers after the top three can be grouped 
together where they fall in the range between 150,000 and 
200,000 killed tasks. 
The following eight fall in the range between 100,000 
and 150,000 killed tasks. The rest of customers committed a 
kill task event in a frequency below 100,000 times. In light 
of the above, we can highlight the customers 290, 772 and 
225 as their behavior can give a strong indication of brut 
forcing technique. Such behavior can be linked to the 
proposed attack model where customers’ confidentiality can 
be violated. 
VII. FUTURE WORK  
Analyzing large datasets consumes time and needs a 
computational power in order to be analyzed, yet it is vital to 
increase our understanding of a system. In this paper we just 
run the first mile, yet we have been able to reconstruct a 
proposed attack model partially. Due to the computational 
limitation and time constrains we could not reconstruct the 
whole attack model. So, in the near future we will 
reconstruct the complete attack model with in depth analysis. 
Also, we will investigate empirically how restrictions in 
tasks affect Multi-Tenancy? 
VIII. CONCLUSION  
 Multi-Tenancy is often seen as a benefit to Cloud 
providers; however, it comes with an associated security risk. 
When security comes first, a natural proposal is to eliminate 
this risk; [12] proposes the elimination of the virtualization 
layer in order to increase system security. However, the cost 
of such a change for existing systems (especially large 
Clouds) will be high. Also, the valuable feature of VM 
reallocation will not be possible in such a scenario, which 
will lead to performance degradation (i.e. low level of 
utilization of resources). 
On the other hand, [13] shows Multi-Tenancy as an 
opportunity must be utilized without mentioning the security 
concerns related to it. Between those extremes, [15] 
identifies Multi-Tenancy as vulnerability yet suggests that 
Cloud providers expose it to customers without giving any 
solution to at least mitigate its risks. Such exposure to the 
problem without providing a real solution will make 
customers depart from Cloud providers. 
This paper studies Multi-Tenancy in depth highlighting 
its origins, benefits and what is unique about it. Also, it 
proposes a system model and a resource allocation technique 
that will achieve the balance between both security and the 
benefits gained from Multi-Tenancy. In addition, we propose 
an approach in how to tackle Multi-Tenancy in a novel way 
in order to reach a balanced point between its benefits and 
Cloud security. 
Moreover, this paper introduces security as a requirement 
when designing resource allocation techniques without 
affecting performance, power consumption, and cost. 
Finally, a proposed attack model is reconstructed partially 
from Google’s dataset where three customers are identified 
as suspicious customers. 
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